With the recent rise of cryptocurrencies, the security and management of crypto-tokens have become critical. We have witnessed many attacks on users, their software, or their providers, which have resulted in significant financial losses. To remedy these issues, many wallet solutions have been proposed to store users' crypto-tokens. However, these solutions lack either essential security features, or usability, or do not allow users to express their spending rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies are successful beyond all expectations. Their amazing rise in the last decade has resulted in various open and decentralized platforms that allow users to conduct monetary transfers, write smart contracts used as financial agreements, or participate in predictive markets. If successful, cryptocurrencies promise to revolutionize many fields and businesses. Cryptocurrencies introduce their own cryptotokens used as a currency. Crypto-tokens can be transferred in transactions authenticated by private keys that belong to crypto-token owners. These private keys are managed by wallet software that gives users an interface to interact with the cryptocurrency. There are many cases of stolen keys that were secured by various means [1] , [2] , [3] . Such cases have brought the attention of the research community to the security issues related to key management in cryptocurrencies [4] , [5] , [6] . As enumerated by the previous work [4] , [6] , there are a few categories of key management approaches in Bitcoin, also applicable to other cryptocurrencies.
Password-protected wallets encrypt private keys with userselected passwords. Unfortunately, users often choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced if stolen by cryptocurrencystealing malware [7] ; optionally, such malware may use a keylogger for capturing a passphrase [6] , [8] . Another similar option is to use password-derived wallets that generate keys based on a provided password. However, they also suffer from the possibility of weak passwords [2] . Hardware wallets is a category that promises the provision of better security by introducing devices that enable only the signing of transactions, without revealing the private keys stored on a device. However, these wallets do not provide protection from an attacker with full access to a device [4] , and more importantly, as presented by recent research [9] , they can be exploited by sophisticated malware due to missing two-way authentication in inter-process communication mechanisms. Multi-factor (or multi-step) authentication is provided by wallets from the split control category, which enables spending crypto-tokens only when n of m secrets are used together. This can be achieved by threshold cryptography wallets [5] , [10] , multi-signature wallets [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , and state-aware smart-contract wallets [15] , [16] , [17] . This last class of wallets is interesting, as spending rules are encoded in a smart contract; hence, it can be adjusted almost arbitrarily to the user's needs.
A popular option for storing private keys is to deposit (or even generate) them at server-side hosted wallets and currencyexchange services [18] , [19] , [20] . In contrast to the previous categories, server-side hosted wallets imply trust in a third party, which is a potential risk of such a solution. Due to infamous cases of compromising server-side wallets [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] or fraudulent currency-exchange operators [25] , client-side hosted wallets have started to proliferate. In such wallets, the main functionality, including the storage of private keys, has moved to the user's browser or a local application (e.g., [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] ). Alternatively, this category contains wallets that store only encrypted versions of keys by a third party (e.g., [31] , [32] ). Therefore, trust in the third party has been partially reduced, but the users still depend on the third party's infrastructure. a) Proposed Approach: In this paper, we propose a framework for smart-contract cryptocurrency wallets. Unlike traditional one-size-fits-all solutions, smart contract wallets allow users to customize their wallets to a high extent, similarly to the way they customize their bank accounts or credit cards.
For increased security of smart contract wallets, our framework utilizes 2-factor authentication of a user against data stored at the blockchain of a cryptocurrency, and it is accomplished by: 1) a client, 2) a smart-contract wallet, and 3) an air-gapped authenticator. Our proposed solution utilizes hash-based cryptographic constructs, namely a pseudo-random function, a Merkle tree, and hash chains. We propose a novel combination of these elements that minimizes the amount of data transferred from the authenticator device. Such a design enables us to implement the authenticator in a fully airgapped setting, not requiring even a single USB connection. In addition to that, our construction protects users' cryptotokens from advances in quantum computing, which would make deployed asymmetric algorithms potentially insecure.
Our proposed solution belongs to the category of stateaware smart contract wallets (see Section VIII), and in contrast to the existing solutions [17] , [15] , it provides a protection against a Man-in-the-Machine attacker (MitMa) [9] by an airgapped setting, resilience against quantum computing, and a few useful customizable security features. b) Contributions: • We demonstrate that standard 2-factor authentication methods do not meet either the security or usability requirements for an air-gapped setting and are prone to quantum computing attacks. • We propose a smart-contract wallet framework protected by 2-factor authentication against the blockchain. Our approach utilizes OTPs that are managed in a novel way that enables us to make an authenticator device fully airgapped. • We implement and evaluate our approach at the setting of Ethereum blockchain and its smart contract platform. The proposed smart contract is self-contained, but its operation set can be extended easily by the community. • We introduce and formalize the notion of k-factor authentication against the blockchain and k-factor authentication against the authentication factors themselves. Using these notions, we propose a classification of authentication schemes, and we apply it to related work accordingly.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES A. Cryptocurrency and Smart Contracts
We assume a generic cryptocurrency of which the blocks of records are stored in an ever-growing public distributed ledger called a blockchain, which is resistant by design against modifications. In a blockchain, blocks are linked using a cryptographic hash function, and each new block has to be agreed upon by participants running a consensus protocolthese participants are called miners. Each block may contain orders transferring crypto-tokens, application codes written in a platform-supported language, and the execution orders of such applications. These application codes are referred to as smart contracts and can encode arbitrary processing logic (e.g., agreements) written in a supported language. Interactions between clients and the cryptocurrency system are based on messages called transactions, which can contain either orders transferring crypto-tokens or calls of smart contract functions. All transactions sent to a blockchain are validated by miners who maintain a replicated state of the blockchain. To incentivize miners, blockchain platforms introduce reward and fee schemes.
B. User Authentication
Authentication is a method of verifying the claimed identity of a user who requests access to a resource or a service. If an authentication method requires the user to present a combination of two or more distinct factors proving knowledge, possession, or inherent biometric features, we refer to multi-factor authentication (MFA). In practice, 2-factor authentication (2FA) is commonly used; this is a variant of MFA that requires proving two of mentioned factors -usually knowledge and possession. In order to break particular factors of MFA, the attacker must extract a knowledge factor (e.g., password), physically steal a device possessed by the user, and forge the user's biometric features, respectively. Multi-step authentication (MSA) is an authentication method that requires the user to present a combination of two or more instances of a single factor -proving either knowledge, or possession, or inherent biometric features. The most common variant of MSA is 2-step authentication (2SA), which requires proving two instances of a knowledge factor (e.g., password, softwarebased OTP). In contrast to MFA, breaking MSA requires the attacker to execute only a single type of malicious action, but multiple times in more contexts -for example, extracting a password (e.g., by a keylogger) and extracting a private seed of an application generating OTPs (e.g., by malware). Since terms MFA and MSA differ only in the realization of a particular step's/factor's data source (e.g., sealed hardware VS a software application in the case of 2FA/2SA), we will further use only term MFA (or 2FA) for simplification of the terminology.
C. Merkle Tree
A Merkle tree is a data structure based on the binary tree in which each leaf node contains a hash of a single data block, while each non-leaf node contains a hash of its concatenated children. A Merkle tree enables to efficient verification as to whether some data are associated with a leaf node of a tree by comparing the expected root hash of a tree with the one computed from a hash of the data in the query and the remaining nodes required to reconstruct the root hash (i.e., proof or authentication path). The reconstruction of the root hash has the logarithmic time complexity, which makes the Merkle tree an efficient scheme for membership verification.
D. Notation
By the term operation we refer to an action with a smartcontract wallet, which may involve, for instance, a transfer of crypto-tokens or a change of daily spending limits. Then, we use the term transfer for the indication of transferring crypto-tokens. By {msg} U we denote the message msg digitally signed by U ; h(.): stands for a cryptographic hash function; h i (.) substitutes i-times chained function h(.), e.g., h 2 (.) ≡ h(h(.)); F k (.) denotes a pseudo-random function that is parametrized by a secret seed k; is the string concatenation; and % represents modulo operation over integers;
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND DESIGN SPACE
The main goal of this work is to propose a cryptocurrency wallet framework that gives a flexible, secure, and usable way of managing crypto-tokens. In particular, we aim to achieve: Self-Sovereignty: users can customize spending rules that are enforced by the cryptocurrency system deployed.
In cryptocurrencies, self-sovereignty is a critical property and the main argument for self-sovereign wallets is the natural difference in user needs. Cryptocurrency platforms offer native pre-defined security features that are available for all users. Unfortunately, these solutions lack expressiveness, as they have to fit standard users (who, e.g., store crypto-tokens as a hobby) as well as large cryptocurrency exchange providers, which, due to the value stored, require much better protection. Security: as we have seen in the past, a poor security level of cryptocurrency wallets has caused significant financial losses for individuals and companies [1] , [2] , [3] . We argue that wallets should be designed with security in mind, and, in particular, we point out 2FA solutions, which have successfully contributed to the security of other environments [33] , [34] . In the context of cryptocurrencies, we emphasize that implementing 2FA against the blockchain may be challenging, as all blockchain data are public. We see significant security benefits of an airgapped setting, as it prevents from multiple attack vectors related to connected devices [9] .
A. Threat Model
For a generic cryptocurrency described in Section II, we assume an attacker whose goal is to conduct unauthorized operations (e.g., transfers) on the user's behalf or render a wallet unusable. The attacker is able to eavesdrop on the network traffic as well as to participate in the underlying consensus protocol. However, the attacker is unable to take over the cryptocurrency platform or to break the used cryptographic primitives. We assume that the attacker is able to obtain a user's private key of a cryptocurrency account. Then we assume that the attacker is able to intercept and "override" the user's transactions, e.g., by launching a manin-the-middle (MITM) attack or by creating a conflicting malicious transaction with a higher fee, which will incentivize miners to discard the user's transaction.
B. Design Space
As we present in Section VIII, there are many types of wallets with different properties. In our context, to achieve selfsovereignty we identify smart-contract wallets as a promising category. These wallets manage crypto-tokens by the functionality of smart contracts, enabling users to have customized control over their wallets. The advantages of these solutions are that spending rules can be defined by users and then enforced by the cryptocurrency platform itself -it is impossible to bypass them, as they are verified by miners. Therefore, using this approach, it is possible to build a flexible wallet with features such as daily spending limits or transfer limits.
With spending rules encoded within a smart contract, it is feasible to design and implement custom security features into a smart contract, such as an air-gapped 2FA. In such a setting, an air-gapped authenticator produces one-time passwords (OTPs) to authenticate transactions. Necessary security requirements for 2FA realized by OTPs are following: 1) Authenticity: each OTP must be associated only with a single authenticator instance, and thus must allow the verification of the authenticity of an OTP. 2) Linkage: each OTP otp i must be linked with exactly a single operation O i , ensuring that otp i cannot be used for the authentication of O j , i = j. 3) Independence: the OTP of the operation O i cannot be derived from another OTP otp j of an operation O j , i = j or an arbitrary set of such OTPs. We argue that not all solutions are feasible for such a purpose. Asymmetric cryptography primitives such as digital signatures or zero-knowledge proofs are inadequate in this setting, despite the fact that they meet all OTP requirements. State-of-the-art signature schemes [35] , [36] with a short signature size produce a 40-64B long output. However, transferring even 40B in an air-gapped environment would lack usability for regular users. Another drawback of asymmetric cryptography relates to its resource demands that increase the operational costs, both on authenticators and on smart contracts (smart contract platforms put a high execution cost for asymmetric cryptography). Finally, most of the currently deployed asymmetric constructions are vulnerable against a quantum computer [37] .
Approaches based on symmetric cryptography primitives produce much shorter outputs, but it is challenging to implement them with smart-contract wallets. Widely used onetime passwords like HOTP [38] or TOTP [39] require the user to share a secret key with the authentication server. Then, with each authentication request the user proves that he has the key by returning the output of a pseudo-random function computed with a nonce (i.e., HOTP) or the current timestamp (i.e., TOTP). This approach is insecure in our setting, as the user would have to share his secret key with a smart-contract wallet, making the key publicly visible.
One solution that does not need to publicly disclose secret information, and, at the same time, provides short enough OTPs, can be implemented by Lamport's hash chains [40] . A hash chain enables the production of many OTPs by the successive execution of a hash function, starting from k that represents a secret key of the authenticator. Upon the initialization, a smart contract is preloaded with the last generated value h n (k). When the user wants to authenticate the ith operation, he sends the h n−i (k) to the smart contract. The smart contract computes the hash function consecutively i times and checks to ascertain whether the obtained value equals the stored value.
However, the main disadvantage of this solution is that each OTP can be trivially derived from any previous one. Therefore, selective authentication is impossible, as revealing the ith OTP allows the attacker to derive any jth OTP, where j < i. In short, this scheme does not meet the security requirement on the independence of OTPs.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
For a generic cryptocurrency described in Section II, we propose a 2FA solution that consists of three components: 1) a client, 2) a smart-contract wallet, and 3) an air-gapped authenticator (see Figure 1 ). We first explain the key idea of our approach, which enables us to realize the authenticator as an air-gapped device. Then, we present the base protocol of our approach, and finally, we incrementally show modifications that improve the efficiency and usability of our approach.
A. Design of an Air-Gapped Authenticator
We propose an approach where OTPs are generated by a pseudo-random function F k (.) and then aggregated by a Merkle tree, providing a single value -the root hash. In contrast to digital signatures, the root hash serves only for proving the non-repudiation of a particular OTP, thus an arbitrary message cannot be protected. To overcome this limitation, we propose a two-stage approach, where an operation is first submitted to the blockchain and then, in the second stage, it is executed upon authentication by the OTP that corresponds to the unique identifier of this operation.
Another challenge is the OTP size. Using the naïve version of our scheme, a 2FA requires the authenticator to provide an OTP and its proof. However, in such a naïve version, the user has to transfer O + S × H bytes from the authenticator each time he confirms an operation, where O represents the size of an OTP, S represents the output size of a hash function, and H represents the height of a Merkle tree with N leaves; hence H = log 2 (N ). For example, if O = S = 32B and H = 10, then the user would have to transfer 352B each time he confirms an operation, which has a very low usability in an air-gapped setting. Even further reduction of O and S to 16B would not help to resolve this usability issue, as the amount of user transferred data would be equal to 176B.
We make the observation that it is possible to decouple providing OTPs from providing their authentication paths (i.e., proofs). In this setting, the only data that need to be kept secret are OTPs, while any node of a Merkle tree may potentially be disclosed. 1 Therefore, we propose providing OTPs by the authenticator, while their proofs can be constructed at the client from stored hashes of OTPs. This improvement enables us to fetch the nodes of the proof from the client's storage, while the user has to transfer only the OTP itself from the authenticator (i.e, O = 16B by default) when confirming an operation, regardless of the height H of the tree. 
B. Base Version a)
Bootstrapping of the Framework: Our scheme is bootstrapped first, and this process is depicted in Figure 1 . First, a secret seed k is generated at the authenticator. Next, the user transfers k from the authenticator to the client in an airgapped manner. Then, the client generates OTPs, computing
where N is the number of leaves (i.e., equal to number of OTPs in the base version). Next, these OTPs are used for computing the root hash. After this step, k and the OTPs are deleted from the client, and the client stores only the leaves of the tree (i.e., the hashes of the OTPs). Finally, the client deploys a smart contract (see Algorithm 1) on the blockchain, and the root hash is passed as an argument to the constructor of the smart contract. 2 In the constructor, the root hash is stored and the sender of the message is saved as the owner of the smart contract. The address of the owner enables the smart contract to verify whether a transaction was signed by the user who created the contract, while the root hash enables verifying whether an OTP was produced by the user's authenticator. b) Operation Execution: When the wallet framework is initialized, it is ready for executing operations. To provide 2-factor authentication capability, we split the protocol of an operation execution into two stages, as depicted in Figure 2 : 1) Initialization Stage. When the user decides to execute an operation with his smart-contract wallet, he enters the details of the operation into the client that creates a transaction calling initOp(), which is provided with operation-specific parameters -the type of operation (e.g., transfer), a numerical parameter (e.g., amount to transfer, new daily limit), and an address parameter (e.g., recipient). Then, the client signs this transaction with the user's private key P K U and sends it to the blockchain. In the function initOp(), the smart contract verifies whether the signature was created by the owner of the wallet (the first step of authentication), stores the parameters of the operation, and then assigns a sequential ID (i.e., opID) to the initiated operation. In the response from the smart contract, the client is provided with an opID. 2) Confirmation Stage. After the initiated transaction is published on the blockchain, the user proceeds to the second stage of the protocol. In this stage, the user passes the opID to the authenticator, which, in turn, computes (i.e., F k (opID)) and displays the OTP associated with opID. Storing hashes computed from OTPs at the client enables the user to transfer only the displayed OTP from the authenticator to the client, which can be accomplished in an air-gapped manner. Considering a mnemonic implementation [41] , this means an air-gapped transfer of 12 words in the case of O = 16B. 3 Then, the client computes and appends the corresponding proof to the OTP. The proof of the OTP is computed from stored hashes of all OTPs in the client's storage. Next, the client sends a transaction with the OTP and its proof to the blockchain, calling the function confirmOp() of the smart contract. This function verifies the authenticity of the OTP (i.e., the first requirement on OTPs) and whether it is associated with the requested operation (i.e., the second requirement on OTPs), which together implies 3 Note that mnemonic bytes-to-string and string-to-bytes conversions can be presented as a part of the authenticator and the client, while the client can communicate with the smart contract using raw data only -not requiring expensive computations for such conversions at the smart contract. the correctness of the OTP. In detail, upon calling the confirmOp() function with an operation ID and OTP with its proof as the arguments, the smart contract computes the root hash from the provided arguments by the function deriveRootHash() that is presented in Appendix B. 4 In this function, first a check of the correct length of the proof is made in order to avoid a second pre-image attack on the root hash. Second, an OTP index is derived from the passed proof, and then the derived index is compared with the index of an operation that the user confirms (i.e., opID). If this check is successful, then the root hash is computed and compared with the expected root hash in the calling function verifyOTP(). In the positive case, the operation is executed (e.g., crypto-tokens are transferred).
In the following subsections, we present extensions of our framework that improve its efficiency and usability, and introduce new features.
C. Increasing the Number of OTPs
A small number of OTPs can have usability and security consequences. First, users executing transactions frequently would need to create new OTPs often. Second, an attacker possessing P K U can flood the smart-contract wallet with initialized operations, rendering all the OTPs unusable. Therefore, we need to increase the number of OTPs in order to make an attack unfeasible. However, increasing the number of OTPs linearly increases the amount of data that the client needs to 
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. . . Fig. 3 : An overview of our approach and its improvements. In the left part of the figure, we depict the partitioning of a tree into subtrees, while for each subtree we append hash chains that balance the size of the client's storage and the number of hash computations at the smart contract. In the middle part of the figure, we depict the adjustment of the next parent tree. In the right part of the figure, we depict the details of a subtree, which contains a split control in the provision/verification of OTPs (and their proofs) across the components of our framework. In detail, OTPs are provided by the authenticator, while proofs are constructed from the Hth layer of the parent Merkle tree stored at the client. A proof contains only HS − LS nodes, as the remaining LS nodes are under the control of the smart contract.
preserve in its storage. For example, if the number of OTPs is 2 20 , then the client has to store 16B × 2 20 ∼ = 16.7M B of data locally, which is feasible even on storage-limited devices. However, for 2 30 OTPs, the client needs to store around 16.4GB of data, which may be inconvenient even on workstations.
To solve this issue, we propose modifying the base approach by applying a time-space trade-off method [42] for OTPs. Namely, we introduce hash chains of which last items are aggregated by a Merkle tree. With such a construction, OTPs can be encoded as elements of a chain and revealed layer by layer in the reverse direction to the direction of creating the chains. This allows multiplication of the number of OTPs by the chain length without increasing the client's storage overhead, but imposing a larger number of hash computations on the smart contract and the authenticator.
An illustration of this construction is presented in the bottom left part of Figure 3 (note that this figure contains further, not yet described, improvements). A hash chain of length P is built from each OTP assumed so far. Then, the last items of all hash chains are used as the first iteration layer that provides N/P OTPs. 5 Similarly, the penultimate items of all the hash chains are used as the second iteration layer, etc., until the last iteration layer consisting of the first items of hash chains has been reached (i.e., outputs of F k (.)). We emphasize that introducing hash chains may cause a violation of the requirement on the independence of OTPs if implemented naïvely -i.e., OTPs from lower iteration layers can be used to derive OTPs in upper layers. Therefore, to enforce this requirement, we invalidate all the OTPs associated with the previous iteration layers by a sliding window at the smart contract. 5 We assume for simplicity that the greatest common divisor of N, P is P .
The authenticator has to be updated to provide OTPs by
where i is an operation ID, α(i) determines an index in a hash chain (i.e., a number of hash computations), and β(i) determines an index in the last iteration layer of OTPs (i.e., outputs of pseudo-random function). We provide concrete expressions for α(i) and β(i) in Equation 3 , which involves all proposed improvements and optimizations. A derivation of the root hash from the OTP in the smart contract needs to be updated as well (see Algorithm 6 of Appendix B). 6 In detail, the smart contract needs to execute P − α(i) − 1 = iP N hash computations, which is a complementary number to a number of hash computations at the authenticator with regard to the length of hash chain P. Also, the client needs to be modified, requiring a computation of a proof to use a leaf index relative to a current iteration layer of OTPs, computed as i % N P . With this improvement, given P = 2 10 and the client storing only 16.7M B of data (i.e., hashes built from the first iteration layer of OTPs), the client can use 2 30 OTPs within a single tree. On the other hand, this approach requires, on average, the execution of additional P/2 hash computations at the smart contract, imposing additional costs. However, our experiments prove the benefits of this approach, as shown in Section V-A.
D. Depletion of OTPs
Even with the previous modification, the number of OTPs remains bounded, and thus once OTPs may be depleted. We propose handling depleted OTPs by a special operation that replaces the current tree with a new one. In order to introduce a new tree securely, we propose updating the root hash value while using the last OTP of the current tree for confirmation. Nevertheless, for this purpose we cannot use our protocol consisting of two stages, as the attacker possessing P K U could be "faster" than the user and might initialize the last operation and thus block all the funds in the wallet. If we were to allow repeated initialization of this operation, then we would create a race condition issue. To avoid this race condition issue, we propose replacing the root hash during three stages that require two append-only lists (see Algorithm 2): 1) A hash value is computed from a concatenation of the last OTP with a new root hash and the result is appended into the first list. 2) A new root hash is appended into the second list.
3) The last OTP of the tree with its proof is passed to a function handling the third stage, where the first matching entries of the first list and the second list are located in order to confirm and perform the introduction of a new root hash. Finally, the lists are cleared for future updates. Note that locating the first entries in the lists relies on the append-only feature of lists, and hence no attacker can make the first valid pair of entries in the lists. For the security analysis of this operation, we refer the reader to Section VI. With this improvements, the authenticator needs to be adapted to support an unlimited number of operations (see Equation 3 ). 7 In order to adapt this improvement at the client, the client needs to compute and store leaves associated with a new tree. Therefore, a user provides the client with k again. Once the leaves are computed, the client replaces its storage with the new leaves and then deletes the OTPs and k. Adjusted in the constructor parentRootHash;
Adjusted in the constructor function setN extSubtree(nextSubLayer, otp, proof, aPath) public assert(sender == owner); assert(nextOperId = N − 1); Not the last oper. of parent tree assert(nextOperId == N S − 1);
The last oper. of a subtree assert(currentSubLayer.len == nextSubLayer.len); verifyOTP(otp, proof, nextOperId); nextOperId++;
Accounts for this introduction of subtree currentSubLayer ← nextSubLayer; croot = reduceMT(currentSubLayer, currentSubLayer.len); assert(isSubtreeConsistent(croot, aPath, parentRootHash)); the number of leaves, the cost imposed on the blockchain platform may be significant for higher trees. We propose to reduce this cost by caching an arbitrary tree layer of depth L at the smart contract, and do path verifications against such a cached layer. Hence, each call of deriveRootHash() will execute L fewer hash computations in contrast to the version that derives the root hash, while the client will transfer by L fewer elements in the proof.
The minimal operational cost can be achieved by directly caching leaves of the tree, which accounts only for hash computations coming from hash chains, not a Merkle tree. However, storing such an amount of cached data on the blockchain is too expensive. Therefore, this cost optimization must be considered as a trade-off between the depth L of the cached layer and the price required for the storage of such a cached layer at the blockchain (see Section V-A, where an optimal cached layer is determined).
We depict this optimization in the left part of Figure 3 , and we show that an optimal caching layer can be further partitioned into caching sublayers of subtrees (we introduce subtrees later). The right part of the figure shows how we combine Merkle tree and hash chains. To enable this optimization, the cached layer of the Merkle tree must be stored by the constructor of the smart contract instead of the root hash. Since that moment onward, the cached layer replaces the functionality of the root hash, reducing the size of proofs. During the confirmation of operation, an OTP and its proof are used for the derivation of a particular node in the cached layer, instead of the root hash. Then the derived value is compared with an expected node present in the cached layer. The index of an expected node in the cached layer is computed as
where i is the ID of an operation. b) Partitioning to Subtrees: The caching of the optimal layer minimizes the combined (i.e., deployment and operational) costs of the wallet, but on the other hand, it requires prepayment for storing the cache on the blockchain. If the cached layer were to contain a high number of nodes, then the initial deployment cost could be prohibitively high, and moreover, the user might not deplete all the prepaid OTPs.
To overcome this usability issue, we propose partitioning an optimal cached layer to groups having the same size, forming sublayers that belong to subtrees (see the left part of Figure 3 ).
Starting with the deployment of the smart contract, the cached sublayer of the first subtree and the "parent" root hash are passed to the constructor; the cached sublayer is stored on the blockchain and its consistency against the parent root hash is verified. Then during the operational stage, when confirmation of operation is performed, the passed OTP is verified against a particular node in the cached sublayer of the current subtree (saving costs for not doing verification against the parent root hash). If the last OTP of the current subtree is reached, then no operation other than the introduction of the next subtree can be initialized (see the green dashed arrow in Figure 3 ). Namely, the client introduces the next subtree in a single step by calling the smart contract's function setNextSubtree() (see Algorithm 3) with the arguments containing: 1) the last OTP of the current subtree, provided by the authenticator, and 2) the cached sublayer of the next subtree, which is computed by the client from its storage. The pseudo-code of introducing the next subtree (i.e., its sublayer) is shown in Algorithm 3. The current subtree's cached sublayer is replaced and verified by the function isSubtreeConsistent() against the parent root hash with the use of the passed authentication path (i.e., aP ath). 8 Notice that introducing a new subtree invalidates all initialized and not yet confirmed operations of the previous subtree. At the authenticator, this improvement requires accommodating the iteration over layers of hash chains in shorter periods. The authenticator provides OTPs by using the formula from Equation 1 with the following functions:
where i is an operation ID and N S is the number of OTPs provided by a single subtree. We remark, that due to this optimization, the update of a new parent root hash requires, additionally to Algorithm 2, the introduction of a cached sublayer of the first subtree.
F. Functionality Extension of the Wallet
So far, we have considered only the crypto-token transfer operation. However, our proposed protocol enables us to extend the set of operations; for example, to give users more flexibility and security in managing their crypto-tokens. In order to increase the security features of our wallet, we extended the operation set by supporting daily spending limits and last resort information.
a) Daily Limit: Adjusting a daily spending limit is a functionality that contributes primarily to the user's selfmonitoring of expenses, but at the same time, it avoids typos in a transferred amount that exceeds a daily limit. This operation has the only argument representing an amount that can be spent in a single calendar day. b) Last Resort Address and Timeout: As users may lose their secrets, leading to an unrecoverable state, we propose an extension that deals with such a situation based on the last resort address and timeout options. This sort of a functionality needs two operations, one for the adjustment of the last resort address and another one for the adjustment of the timeout. If the timeout has elapsed, then anyone may call a dedicated function that transfers all the crypto-tokens of the wallet to the last resort address and destroys the contract.
V. REALIZATION IN PRACTICE
We have selected the Ethereum cryptocurrency and the Solidity language for the implementation of the smart contract, HTML with JS for the client, and Java (Android) for the authenticator. The smart contract and the client are cryptocurrency-specific components, while the authenticator is cryptocurrency-agnostic and thus can be directly reused in any other cryptocurrencies with similar capabilities. In our implementation, we selected the size of OTPs equal to 16B, which has practical advantages for an air-gapped authenticator, producing OTPs that are 12 mnemonic words long, 9 and at the same time, providing a sufficient security level for most use cases. Next, we used SHA-3 (with truncated output to 16B) as h(.) and as an instantiation of F k (.). We selected size of the seed k equal to 16B, enabling the user to rewrite 12 mnemonic words to backup/restore the authenticator. The source code of our full implementation will be made available upon publication.
A. Analysis of the Costs
Executing smart contracts over blockchain, i.e., performing computations and storing data, has its costs. In Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), these costs are expressed by the level of execution complexity of particular EVM instructions, referred to as gas. One unit of gas has its market price in GWEI. In this section, we analyze the costs of our approach using the same value for the hash size S as well as the OTP size O, namely, 16B. The S significantly influences the gas consumption for storing the cached layer at the blockchain, while the effect of O is negligible. We remark that measured costs can also be influenced by EVM internals (e.g., 32B-long words and corresponding alignment). In the following, we perform a series of gas measurements experiments investigating the parameters of the Merkle tree and hash chains.
1) Costs Related to the Merkle Tree a) Deployment Cost:
The cost of smart contract deployment is driven mainly by the depth L S of the cached sublayer of the first subtree and the size S of each hash in this sublayer. A less significant factor is the consistency check of a Merkle tree, which first computes the root hash of the first subtree from the cached sublayer and then verifies the consistency of the subtree against the parent root hash. Therefore, the higher L S is, the more layers need to be reduced. Similarly, the greater H − H S is, the more steps need to be done in proof verification. On the other hand, deployment costs are independent of the length P of a hash chain; therefore, we omit the hash chain in this experiment and set P = 1.
Further, we abstract from the concept of subtrees in order to analyze a single tree (i.e., H = H S ). The deployment costs of our scheme with respect to depth L of the cached layer are presented in Figure 4 . The figure differentiates two cases -one uses a single wallet contract and the second assumes a factory contract that creates instances of the wallet contract. Thanks to the factory contract, we managed to save approximately 1.3M of gas, which we assume in all the following. Since 8M is the maximum gas limit at the Ethereum main network, we can build a caching layer with L S = 7 maximally (i.e., requiring 6.6M of gas for deployment). Therefore, as we will see later, the maximum H S that can be used for the optimal caching layer of a subtree is H S = L S + 3 = 10, yielding 2 10 leaves and thus 2 10 P OTPs per subtree.
b) Cost of a Transfer: Although the cost of each operation supported by our protocol is similar, for this experiment we selected the transfer of crypto-tokens (i.e., O t ) that is supposed to be the most frequent type. We measured the average total cost per O t as follows:
where the function cost() measures the cost of an operation in gas units, and O d represents deployment operation. As the purpose of the cached layer is to reduce the number of hash computations in confirmOp(), the size of an optimal cached layer is subject to a trade-off between the cost of storing a cached layer at the blockchain and the savings benefit of the caching. In order to explore the properties of the only Merkle tree, we adjust H = H S and P = 1. As each execution of O t may have a slightly different gas cost, we measure the average cost of a transaction (i.e., cost(O t (L, N, P )) for both stages of our protocol. For completeness, we present the transaction costs of all proposed operations in Appendix C. The average total cost of a transfer operation is depicted in Figure 5 . We can see that the total average cost per transfer decreases with the increasing number of OTPs, as the deployment cost is spread across more OTPs. For each N , we highlight the optimal point that represents the depth of the cached layer for which the total cost per transfer is minimized. The optimal point balances the deployment cost (i.e., cost(O d (L))) and the average cost of a transfer operation (i.e., cost(O t (L, N, P ))).
An important observation is that the depth of the cached layer for such an optimal point equals H − 3. In contrast to the version without caching, this optimization has brought a cost reduction of 3.87%, 5.61%, 7.32%, and 8.92%, for 128, 256, 512, and 1,024 leaves (i.e., OTPs here), respectively. Another question we explored is the number of transfer operations to be executed until a profit of the caching optimization has begun. We computed a rolling average cost per transfer operation, while distinguishing between an optimal caching layer (i.e., L = H − 3) and disabled caching (i.e., L = 0). The tipping point that marks the beginning of a profit from caching is at 53, 90, and 156 transfers for H equal 8, 9, and 10, respectively (see Figure 7 ).
c) Costs with Subtrees:
We measured the cost of introducing the next subtree within a parent tree depending on L S , while we set H = 20 and H S = 10 (see Figure 6 ). We found out that when subtrees (and their caching sublayers) are introduced within a dedicated operation, it is significantly cheaper in contrast to introducing subtrees during the deployment. Thanks to this finding, we can further decrease the average total cost per operation, and moreover we can cache sublayers up to the depth of 9. With this in mind, we calculate an average cost per transfer at 136,042 of gas, which is 26% less than in the case without subtrees and caching. 
2) Costs Related to Hash Chains
Since each iteration layer of hash chains contributes to an average cost of conf irmOp() with around the same value, we first measured this value on a few "small" trees with many iteration layers (up to 512) and found out that it is equal, on average, to 170 units of gas. Next, using this value and the deployment cost, we calculated the average total cost per transfer operation by adding layers of hash chains to a tree with H = H S , and thus increasing N by a factor of P until the minimum cost was found. As a result of spreading the deployment cost among more operations, the optimal caching layer shifted to the leaves of the tree -i.e., L = H (see Figure 8a ). However, in such a case, the gas limit of Ethereum was exceeded. Therefore, we adjusted the caching layer to the maximum value not exceeding the gas limits (i.e., L = 7), as depicted in Figure 8b . In contrast to the configurations with L = 0 and P = 1 (from Figure 5) , we achieved savings of 27.80%, 19.61%, 14.95%, and 12.51% for trees with H equal to 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively. For the sake of completeness, we calculated costs for L = 0 as well (see Figure 8c ). Note that for L = 0 and L = 7, smaller trees are less expensive, as they require less operations related to Merkle tree in contrast to bigger trees; these operations consume substantially more gas than operations related to hash chains. Although in this experiment we minimized the total cost per transfer by finding an optimal P , we highlight that increasing P contributes to the cost only minimally, but on the other hand, it increases the variance of the cost. Hence, one may set this parameter at even higher values, depending on the use case.
3) Costs in Fiat Money
We assume the average exchange rate of ETH/USD equal to 106 and the gas price 6 GWEI 10 as of November 27, 2018 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security properties of our scheme and its resilience to the attacker model considered.
A. Requirements on OTPs
In order to meet the requirement on the independence of two different OTPs, all OTPs must be generated in a manner ensuring that no information about a single OTP can be derived from any other set of OTPs. This is satisfied by the definition of F k (.), and it is applicable when P = 1. However, if P > 1, then items in previous iteration layers can be derived from the next ones. Therefore, to enforce this requirement, we employ an implicit invalidation of all OTPs belonging to the previous iteration layers by a sliding window. The requirement on the linkage of OTPs with operations is met thanks to the pseudo-randomness of OTPs in the current iteration layer and by the Merkle tree preserving the order of its aggregated OTPs. By meeting these requirements, an attacker is unable to use an intercepted OTP to confirm an operation other than the one associated with the stolen OTP. The requirement on the authenticity of OTPs is ensured by the pseudo-random generation of k as well as by storing the root hash of the Merkle tree at the smart contract.
B. Attacks with a Post Quantum Computer
The resilience of the Merkle tree scheme against quantum computers is dependent on the output size of the function F k (.) used for the generation of OTPs. Grover's algorithm [43] provides quadratic speedup in searching for the input of the black box function that produces a particular output. In theory, it reduces the cryptography strength of F k (.) by one-half. Nevertheless, previous research [44] using Grover's algorithm with several realistic assumptions has shown that a cryptography strength of SHA-3 with 256 bits is reduced to 166 bits, instead of the expected 128 bits, which may apply to the shrunk version of SHA-3 as well.
C. Use Cases a) Deployment of a New Contract: This operation can be accomplished by a single transaction. If there is any adversarial modification of transaction's data by an attacker, then the client can notice it from the blockchain immediately and abandon the contract.
b) Any Operation with Our Two-Stage Protocol: In the first stage, the user calls the function initOp() that appends information about an operation to the list of pending operations. In the second stage, the user calls the function confirmOp() with the arguments containing the OTP linked to the operation he previously initiated. Therefore, an attacker who intercepts the transaction with the confirmOp() call cannot use the stolen OTP for the confirmation of another operation. c) Transfer the Balance to the Last Resort Address: This operation is introduced for dealing with a lost private key or a lost/broken authenticator, including the lost recovery phrase k. Therefore, it is important to ensure that an attacker cannot sabotage the expected effect. In detail, we ensure that refreshment of the variable holding the day of the most recent operation is made only in the second stage of our protocol. d) Introduction of the Next Subtree: This operation can be executed in a single step, as the last index of a subtree is unambiguously associated with the type of this operation, and at the same time, the consistency of the passed cached layer is verified against the parent root hash. Therefore, if an attacker were to steal the OTP, he could use it only for introduction of the next valid subtree. e) Introduction of the Next (Parent) Tree: In contrast to the adjustment of the next subtree, the situation here is more difficult to handle, as the new tree cannot be verified at the smart contract against any paramount field. If we were to use our proposed protocol while constraining to the last initialized operation, then an attacker could sabotage the wallet by submitting an arbitrary root hash and thus blocking all the funds in the wallet. If we were to allow repeated initialization of this operation, then we would create a race condition issue. Therefore, this operation needs to be handled outside of our two-stage protocol, using two unlimited append-only lists that are manipulated in 3 stages. In the first stage, the OTP concatenated with the next parent root hash are hashed and appended to the first list. If the expected value appears on the blockchain, the user proceeds to the second stage, where he appends the next parent root hash to the second list. When it appears on the blockchain, the user can safely reveal the OTP for confirmation of the first matching entries in both lists. Although an attacker might use an intercepted OTP for appending malicious arguments into the first and the second list, when he proceeds to the third stage and submits the OTP, the user's entries will match as the first.
VII. DISCUSSION
a) Requirement on Block Confirmations: Most cryptocurrencies suffer from the possibility of accidental forks, which create parallel inconsistent blockchain views. In our context, overly fast confirmation of an operation may be dangerous, as, if an operation was initiated in an "incorrect" view, an attacker could hijack the OTP and reuse it for a malicious operation settled in the "correct" view. To prevent this threat, the recommendation is to wait several block confirmations to ensure that an accidental fork has not happened. For example, in Ethereum, the recommended number of block confirmations to wait is 12 (i.e., ∼3 minutes). Note that such waiting can be done as a background task of the client, hence the user does not have to wait. b) Usability: Our approach inherits the common usability characteristics of 2FA schemes, such as an extra device to carry, effort for securely storing recovery phrase k, effort for an air-gapped transfer of OTPs, and effort for recalling/entering passwords. Of those, the motivation of our work was on effort for an air-gapped transfer of OTPs, which takes up to 20-25 seconds when using OTPs with size of 16B. However, until effective quantum computer is developed, our scheme can be used even with smaller size of OTPs (e.g., 10B or 12B), which enable to shorten the time required for an air-gapped transfer of OTP (e.g., by 25% and 37% for the example values above).
In addition to the common usability characteristics of 2FA schemes, our approach requires the user to perform an extra operation for introducing a new subtree/parent tree once in a while.
c) Sustainability of Blockchain: A space required for storing a cached layer of the Merkle tree affects the size of a blockchain. On the other hand, a natural incentive of the user is to maximize a saving by caching, regardless of the sustainability of a blockchain. d) Passwords: For simplicity, in the description of our approach we abstracted from password protection at the authenticator and the client. However, to achieve (2 + 1/1)factor authentication, it is necessary to set them up. This authentication scheme represents a signature made by P K U and OTP from the authenticator + a password to access P K U and password to access the authenticator (see Section VIII-A).
VIII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first propose a classification of blockchain-related authentication schemes, and then we extend the previous work of Eskandari et al. [4] and Bonneau et al. [6] , by categorizing and reviewing examples of cryptocurrency wallet solutions. For an overview of these solutions, see Table II and Appendix D.
A. Proposed Classification
In the context of the blockchain, we distinguish between k-factor authentication against the blockchain and k-factor authentication against the authentication factors themselves. For example, an authentication method may require the user to perform 2-of-2 multi-signature in order to execute a transfer, while a user may keep each private key stored in a dedicated device -each requiring a different password. In this case, 2FA is performed against the blockchain, as the correctness of both signatures is verified by all miners of the blockchain. Additionally, a one-factor authentication is performed once in each device of a user by entering a password in each of them. For clarity we classify each authentication scheme by the following notation:
where Z ∈ {0,1,...} represents the number of authentication factors against the blockchain,
denotes the minimum number of secret shares required to use the complete i-th secret (e.g., Shamir secret sharing [45] ), and X j i ∈ {0,1,...} | i ∈ [1,...,Z], j ∈ [1,...,W i ] represents the number of authentication factors against the i-th factor of Z, which, to be performed, additionally requires W i shares to use the full ith secret. With this in mind, we remark that the previous example provides 2 (1,1) + (1)/(1) -factor authentication -twice against the blockchain (i.e., two signatures), once for accessing the first device (i.e., the first password) and once for accessing the second device (i.e., the second password). Note that we consider an implicit value of W i = 1; hence, the classification (2 + 1/1) represents the same as the previous one. If one of the private keys were to be additionally split into two shares, each encrypted by a password, then such an approach provides 2 (2,1) + (1,1)/(1) -factor authentication.
B. Wallet Types a) Keys in Local Storage: In this category of wallets, the private keys are stored in plaintext form on the local storage of a machine, thus providing (1 + 0)-factor authentication. Examples that enable the use of unencrypted private key files are Bitcoin Core [46] or MyEtherWallet [47] wallets. One disadvantage of this approach is that any process/user that has access to a directory that contains private keys can steal them.
b) Password-Protected Wallets: Password-protected wallets require a user-specified password to encrypt/decrypt a private key file stored on the local storage, thus providing (1 + 1)-factor authentication. Examples that support this functionality are Armory Secure Wallet [11] , Electrum Wallet [12] , the offline version of MyEtherWallet [47] , Bitcoin Core [46] , and Bitcoin Wallet [48] . This category addresses physical theft, yet enables the brute force of passwords. In the case of digital theft, a keylogger can be installed on a device with keys. c) Password-Derived Wallets: Password-derived wallets [49] (a.k.a., brain wallets or hierarchical deterministic wallets) can compute a sequence of private keys from only a single mnemonic string and/or password. This approach takes the advantage of the key creation in the ECDSA signature scheme that is used by many blockchain platforms. Some password-derived wallets may enable the user to select a short passphrase and then compute a longer seed by a key-stretching function (e.g., PBKDF2) serving for actual derivation of a key sequence [4] . However, such an approach provides a small entropy in seed computation; hence a brute force attack may reveal weak and short passwords. A more highly recommended method of seed computation in password-derived wallets is to let a wallet (pseudo-)randomly generate and encode a mnemonic with the length of ≥128 bits (e.g., by BIP-39 [41] ), and then compute a seed by a key stretching function (e.g., PBKDF2). Additionally, a user-specified passphrase (also referred to as seed extension) may be added to a seed computation as a salt in order to create (limited) protection against physical theft. Examples of password-derived wallets are Electrum [12] , Armory Secure Wallet [11] , and Daedalus Wallet [50] . The wallets in this category provide (1 + X 1 )factor authentication (usually X 1 = 1). d) Hardware Storage Wallets: In general, wallets of this category include devices that can only sign transactions by private keys stored inside a sealed storage, while the keys never leave the device. To sign a transaction, the user connects a device to a machine and enters his passphrase. When signing a transaction, the device displays the transaction's data to the user, who may verify the details. Thus, wallets of this category usually provide (1 + 1)-factor authentication. Note that this category may be viewed as a special case of offline storage, and additionally, may have shared features of other categories (e.g., split control). Popular USB (or Bluetooth) hardware wallets containing displays are offered by Trezor [51] , Ledger [52] , KeepKey [53] , and BitLox [54] . An example of a USB wallet that is not resistant against keyloggers is Ledger Nano [55] -it does not have a display, and after connecting to a machine, it requires a user to enter a PIN code through the client running on the machine. (1 + 0)-factor authentication is provided by a credit-card-shaped hardware wallet from CoolBitX [56] . A hybrid approach that relies on a server providing a relay for 2FA is offered by BitBox USB Wallet [57] . Although a BitBox device does not have a display, after connecting to a machine, it communicates with the client running on the machine and at the same time, it communicates with a smartphone app through BitBox's sever; each requested transaction is displayed and confirmed by the user on the smartphone. One limitation of this solution is the lack of self-sovereignty, as 2FA requires a connection to a server. e) Split Control -Threshold Cryptography: In threshold cryptography [45] , [58] , [59] , [60] , a key is split into several parties which enables the spending of crypto-tokens only when n-of-m parties collaborate. Wallets based on threshold cryptography provide 1 (W1,...,Wn) + (X 1 ,...,X n ) -factor authentication, as only a single signature verification is made on a blockchain, but n verifications are made by parties that compute a signature. Therefore, all the computations for cosigning a transaction are performed off-chain, which provides anonymity of access control policies (i.e., a transaction has a single signature) in contrast to the multi-signature scheme that is publicly visible on a blockchain. An example of this category is presented by Goldfeder et al. [5] . One limitation of this solution is a computational overhead that is directly proportional to the number of involved parties m (e.g., for m = 2 it takes 13.26s). Another example of this category is a USB dongle called Mycelium Entropy [10] , which, when connected to a printer, generates triplets of paper wallets using 2-of-3 Shamir's secret sharing; providing (1 (2) + (0, 0))-factor authentication.
f) Split Control -Multi-Signature Wallets: In the case of multi-signature wallets, n-of-m owners of the wallet must co-sign the transaction made from the multi-owned address. Thus, the wallets of this category provide (n + X 1 /.../X n )factor authentication. One example of a multi-owned address approach is Bitcoin's Pay to Script Hash (P2SH). 11 Examples supporting multi-owned addresses are Lockboxes of Armory Secure Wallet [11] and Electrum Wallet [12] . A property of multi-owned addresses is that each transaction with such an address requires off-chain communication. A hybrid instance of this category and client-side hosted wallets category is Trusted Coin's cosigning service [13] , which provides a 2-of-3 multi-signature scheme and can be integrated with many wallets. When integrated with a wallet, the user owns a primary and a backup key, while TrustedCoin owns the third key. Each transaction is signed first by user's primary key and then, based on the correctness of the OTP from Google Authenticator, by TrustedCoin's key. Another hybrid instance of this category and client-side hosted wallets is Copay Wallet [14] . With Copay, a user can create a multi-owned Copay wallet, where the user has all keys in his machines and each transaction is co-signed by n-of-m keys. Transactions are resent across user's machines during multi-signing through Copay.
g) Split-Control -State-Aware Smart Contracts: State-aware smart contracts provide "rules" for how cryptotokens of a contract can be spent by owners, while they keep the current setting of the rules at the blockchain. The most common example of state-aware smart contracts is the 2-of-3 multi-signature scheme that provides (2 + X 1 /X 2 )factor authentication. An example of the 2-of-3 multi-signature approach that supports only Trezor hardware wallets is Trezor-Multisig2of3 from Unchained Capital [15] . The advantages of this solution are its simplicity and independence from external libraries. One disadvantage of this solution is that the user has to own three Trezor devices, which may be an expensive solution that, moreover, relies only on a single vendor. Another example of this category, but using the n-of-m multi-signature scheme, is Parity Wallet [16] . However, two recent critical bugs [61] , [62] have caused the multi-signature scheme to be currently disabled. The n-of-m multi-signature scheme is also used in Ethereum MultiSigWallet from ConsenSys [17] , further maintained under the Gnosis project [63] . The advantage of this solution is its integration with various kinds of software and hardware wallets, which enables the price-efficient combination of solutions from several vendors. h) Hosted Wallets: Common features of hosted wallets are that they provide an online interface for interaction with the blockchain, managing crypto-tokens, and viewing transaction history, while they also store private keys at the server side. If a hosted wallet has full control over private keys, it is referred to as a server-side wallet. A server-side wallet acts like a bank -the trust is centralized. Due to infamous cases of compromising such server-side wallets [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , the hosted wallets that provide only an interface for interaction with the blockchain, or, alternatively, store only user-encrypted private keys, have started to proliferate. In such wallets, the functionality, including the storage of private keys, has moved to the user's browser (i.e., client). We refer to these kinds of wallets as client-side wallets (a.k.a., hybrid wallets [4] ).
Server-Side Wallets: Coinbase [18] is an example of a server-side hosted wallet, which also provides exchange services. Whenever a user logs in or performs an operation, he authenticates himself against Coinbase's server using a password and obtains a code from Google Authenticator/Authy app/SMS. Other examples of server-side wallets having equivalent security level to Coinbase are Circle Pay Wallet [19] and Luno Wallet [20] . The wallets in this category provide (0 + 2)-factor authentication when 2FA is enabled.
Client-Side Wallets: A popular example of a clientside hosted wallet is Blockchain Wallet [32] . Blockchain Wallet is a password-derived wallet that provides 1-factor authentication against the server based on the knowledge of a password and additionally enables 2FA against the server through one of the options consisting of Google Authenticator, YubiKey, SMS, and email. When creating a transaction, the user can be authenticated by entering his secondary password. Equivalent functionality and security level as in Blockchain Wallet are offered by BTC Wallet [31] (formerly known as Blocktrail Wallet). In contrast to Blockchain Wallet, BTC wallet uses 2FA also during the confirmation of a transaction. Other examples of this category are password-derived wallets, like Mycelium Wallet [26] , CarbonWallet [27] , Citowise Wallet [28] , Coinomi Wallet [29] , and Infinito Wallet [30] , which, in contrast to the previous wallets, do not store backups of encrypted keys at the server. A 2FA feature is provided additionally to password-based authentication, in the case of CarbonWallet. In detail, the 2-of-2 multi-signature scheme uses the machine's browser and the smartphone's browser (or the app) to co-sign transactions that are delivered to a smartphone via a CarbonWallet server.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a smart-contract wallet framework that provides a secure and usable method of managing crypto-tokens in a self-sovereign fashion. The framework provides 2-factor authentication that is executed in two stages of interaction with the blockchain and provides protection against an attacker who has stolen a user's private key. Our framework uses OTPs realized by standard cryptography constructs, namely pseudo-random function, Merkle tree, and hash chains. We combine these primitives in a novel way that provides usability in an air-gapped setting that protects against a Man-in-the-Machine [9] attacker as well as quantum computer attacks. We have implemented our scheme and deployed it in a real-world scenario. Our analysis and performance results show its feasibility and efficiency. In future work, we plan to investigate 2-factor authentication schemes in the context of emerging privacy-preserving smart contract platforms [64] , [65] .
APPENDIX

A. Notation
In the appendix, we use the following notation in addition to the notation used above: function LSB(.) extracts a value of the least significant bit (LSB); a b represents the bitwise left shift of argument a by b bits; and a | b represents bitwise OR of arguments a and b.
B. Details of Utilized Algorithms
When bootstrapping the client, OTPs of the last iteration layer of hash chains are generated by Algorithm 4 using current parent tree index pti and secret seed k. Generated OTPs are then processed by hash chains, obtaining the first iteration layer of OTPs; this layer is further aggregated into root hash by Algorithm 5, which contains recursive in-site implementation. When an OTP is used for authentication of an operation, the root hash is derived from the OTP and its proof -first, by resolving hash chains and then proof itself (see Algorithm 6) . 
C. Cost of All Operations
Operational costs of all implemented operations are shown in Table I . In the table, we do not account for deployment costs, and hence we measure only instant gas consumption of the function calls. Note that the first execution of an operation may be more expensive in contrast to the next ones due to an initialization of some variables (i.e., +15k or +30k of gas depending on the operation). Thus, we measured the gas consumption of the second and later executions of each type of operation. The cost measurements were obtained using configuration with optimal cost (i.e., L S = H S − 3), H = H S and P = 1, and they are independent of the height of Merkle tree H. 
Introduction of the Next Subtree
Depends mainly on L S (see Figure 6 )
Send Crypto-Tokens to the Last Resort Address -13,887 -13,887 
D. Classification and Properties of Related Work
We present a comparison of wallets and approaches from related work (see Section VIII) in Table II . In the table, we classify authentication schemes using our proposed classification, while we also survey a few selected security and usability properties of the wallets [4] . In the following, we briefly describe each property and explain criteria stating how we attributed the properties to particular wallets. a) Air-Gapped Property: We attribute this property (Y) to approaches involving hardware device storing secret information, which do not need a connection to a machine in order to operate. This property also denotes resilience against Man-in-the-Machine attackers [9] . b) Resilience to Tampering with the Client: We attribute this property (Y) to all hardware wallets that sign transactions within a device, while they require the user to confirm transaction's details at a device (based on displayed information). Then, we attribute this property to wallets containing multiple clients that collaborate in several steps to cosigns transactions (a chance that all of them are tampered with is small). We partially (P) attribute this property to approaches do not implicitly provide the protection but instead require additional conditions to meet. c) Post-Quantum Resilience: We attribute this property (Y) to approaches that utilize hash-based cryptography that is known to be resilient against quantum computing attacks [44] . d) No Need for Off-Chain Communication: We attribute this property (Y) to approaches that do not require a former communication among parties (or devices) to build a (co-)signed transaction, before submitting it to a blockchain. e) Malware Resistance (e.g., Key-Loggers): We attribute this property (Y) to approaches that either enable signing transactions inside of a device or split signing control over secrets across multiple devices. f) Secret(s) Kept Offline: We attribute this property (Y) to approaches that keep secrets inside their sealed storage, while they expose only signing transaction functionality. Next, we attribute this property to paper wallets and fully air-gapped devices.
g) Independence of Trusted Third Party: We attribute this property (Y) to approaches that do not require trusted party for operation, while we do not attribute this property to all client-side and server-side hosted wallets. We partially (P) attribute this property to approaches requiring an external relay server for their operation.
h) Resilience to Physical Theft: We attribute this property (Y) to approaches that are protected by an encryption password or PIN. We partially (P) attribute this property to approaches that do not provide password and PIN protection but have a specific feature to enforce uniqueness of an environment in which they are used (e.g., bluetooth pairing).
i) Resilience to Password Loss: We attribute this property (Y) to approaches that provide means for recovery of secrets (e.g., a seed of hierarchical deterministic wallets). 
Hardware Storage Wallets 1 + (X1) 
